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The efficiency-equity dilemma, in conjunction with political partisan interests, has received 
increasing attention in attempts to explain the territorial allocation of investment. However, 
centralization policies that seek to introduce or reinforce the hierarchization of the political 
system have, as yet, to be subject to empirical analysis. The main contribution of this paper, 
therefore, is that it provides evidence that meta-political objectives concerning the organization 
of political and administrative power do influence regional investment. Using data from Spain, 
we demonstrate that investment programs in network modes (i.e., roads and railways) are 
influenced by the centralization strategy of investing in regions near the state’s political capital, 
while investment efforts in non-network modes (i.e., airports and ports) appear to be positively 
related to distance to the capital. Since investment in surface network transportation 
infrastructure is much higher than that in airports and ports, and taking into account that the 
regions surrounding the political capital are poorer than the state’s average, we suggest that 
centralization rather than redistribution has been the driver behind the concentration of public 
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Introduction  
The economic literature has paid increasing attention to the analysis of the factors that explain 
the regional allocation of public investment in infrastructure (Yamano and Ohkawara, 2000; de 
la Fuente, 2005; Kemmerling and Stephan, 2002 and 2010; Knight, 2004; Castells and Solé-
Ollé, 2005; Bel and Fageda, 2009; Solé-Ollé, 2010). Research in this field has focused 
extensively on the efficiency-equity dilemma, in conjunction with political partisan interests, to 
explain the territorial allocation of investment.  
However, focusing solely on this dilemma might lead to one potential objective of transport 
infrastructure and services policy being overlooked: namely, the determination of the patterns of 
political power and the hierarchical structure of territorial administration. In a stimulating paper, 
Faguet (2004) sets out to answer the question as to why there is so much centralization in the 
first place. His model locates central government in a particular geographical space, the 
“capital”, and invokes self-interest on the part of its residents. According to Faguet’s analysis, 
centralization is a consequence of the interests of those that live in the capital city, as they are 
the ones that benefit directly from a highly centralized government within a context where the 
constitutional guarantees of territorial government are only weak.  
This use of infrastructure policy to foster centralization has been analysed in the economic 
history literature for the Australian case - see, for instance, Wotherspoon, 1979; Docwra and 
Kolsen, 1989 and Gray, 2009 - and for the Spanish case – see Bel, 2010. However, to the best of 
our knowledge, the literature lacks robust empirical evidence to support this hypothesis. We 
believe that adopting this approach should shed light on the question as to how infrastructure 
investment is allocated by the central government. This, in turn, should complement analyses 
that centre on the efficiency-equity dilemma and their extension to a consideration of political 
factors.  
The main contribution of this paper, therefore, is that it provides evidence that meta-political 
objectives concerning the organization of political and administrative power do influence 
regional investment. Spain proves to be an interesting testing ground to determine whether 
policies aimed at administrative and political centralization have influenced the regional   3
allocation of investment. The main results from our empirical analysis show that investment 
programs in network modes (i.e., roads and railways) are negatively related to the distance from 
the capital city; thus, they are influenced by the centralization strategy of investing near the 
state’s political capital. By contrast, investment efforts in non-network modes (i.e., airports and 
– obviously – ports) appear to be positively related to distance to the capital. Note that 
investment in terrestrial network transportation infrastructure is much higher than that in airports 
and ports. Given that regions surrounding the political capital are relatively poorer would 
suggest that centralization rather than redistribution has been the main driver behind the 
concentration of public investment in these regions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First we review the related literature. 
Next we explain our empirical strategy. Then we present our results, and discuss their main 
implications. Finally, we draw our main conclusions.  
 
 Literature review 
The economic literature has paid increasing attention to analysing the factors that might account 
for the regional allocation of public investment in infrastructure. Early studies in this vein, such 
as Yamano and Ohkawara (2000) and de la Fuente (2005), focused on the traditional efficiency-
equity trade-off. Other studies, while still concerned with this trade-off, extended their analyses 
to include the role of political factors as determinants of government investment in 
infrastructure.  
Kemmerling and Stephan (2002) show that – in addition to the will to promote equity – the 
distribution of investment grants among German cities is positively related to the political 
support the incumbent party enjoys in each city. Similarly, Knight (2004) analyses US 
Congressional votes over the funding of transportation projects, and finds that the probability of 
supporting such projects increases in cases of own-district spending.  
Castells and Solé (2005) also find that political considerations matter, since governments 
tend to invest more heavily in the regions where electoral productivity is highest. More recently, 
Bel and Fageda (2009) found regional investment in Spain’s airports to be positively related to 
the electoral support for the incumbent party of national government. They also reported a 
positive relation with party alignment in national and regional governments (i.e., when the same 
political party holds power in both tiers).  
Adopting a similar line, Kemmerling and Stephan (2009) emphasize the importance of 
country-specific political institutions in order to explain the regional distribution of investments.   4
In analysing this, the authors undertake a cross-country empirical analysis, considering France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain. This set of countries includes both federal (Germany and Spain) and 
unitarian (France and Italy) states, as well as distinct electoral systems. 
Kemmerling and Stephan (2009) distinguish between (1) normative factors - those of 
efficiency, redistribution and equity, noting that the first two factors constitute conflicting 
objectives; and (2) political factors, among which they emphasize the ideology held by political 
parties (assuming left-wing and regionalist/separatist parties to be positively related with 
investment in the region), partisanship (where party alignment in national and regional 
governments results in the regions receiving greater central investment); and (3) the electoral 
interests of the national government (higher investment in pivotal regions and in the party’s 
strongholds). 
The results these authors report from their empirical estimation suggest that efficiency 
concerns are important in all four countries, and that redistribution is likewise a common key 
objective (albeit not statistically significant in the case of France). However, their results 
concerning the equity objective are more ambiguous, and no unequivocal conclusion can be 
drawn. As for the political variables, here their results are much more mixed, and major cross-
country differences emerge. For example, partisan strongholds receive more investment in Spain 
and Italy, but this is not the case in either Germany or France; regional parties are positively 
related with regional investment in Spain, but this is not so in Italy, left-wing parties are related 
with higher regional investment in Italy and France, but this is not the case in Germany or Spain. 
Overall, there is considerable diversity concerning the effects of political variables, though two 
general trends can be identified: (a) ideological variables only play a significant role in 
centralized systems, and (b) electoral incentives play a role in most countries. 
Solé-Ollé (2009) analyses why “fiscal deficits” attributable to investment in infrastructure 
are the subject of heated debate and concludes, firstly, because such deficits sustained over time 
can mean that the infrastructure capital stocks in rich regions are too small; second, because the 
central government can exercise considerable discretion in the territorial allocation of 
infrastructure investments; and third, because it is not exactly clear what the ‘objective criteria’ 
of infrastructure investment might actually be. Clearly, an important distinction has to be borne 
in mind in order to interpret the concepts here. On the one hand, there is tactical redistribution, 
the so-called pork barrel politics; on the other, there is programmatic redistribution, based on the 
citizen-candidate approach. What matters is that preferences regarding how society is best 
organized are also influenced by political decisions.   5
Solé-Ollé (2009) draws on data for investment and capital stock at Spain’s provincial level 
between 1978 and 2004. The period 1964-1977, before democracy was reestablished in Spain, is 
also considered in the study, but is not included in the analysis of political variables, of which he 
includes the following four in his empirical model; (1) Margin - derived from swing voter 
theory; (2) Votes/seats - associated with efforts to maximize the effectiveness of investments so 
as to ‘buy’ votes;  (3) Aligned governments – i.e., Do your party comrades rule the region?; and 
(4) Pivotal - indicating whether the central government needs support from regional specific 
parties. All these variables were reported as working reasonably well, although the results for 
alignment were mixed: alignment usually proving significant for Social-Democrat (the PSOE in 
the case of Spain) governments, but not for Conservative (PP in the case of Spain) governments. 
Overall, Solé-Ollé’s (op. cit.) results suggest that the regional allocation of infrastructure 
investment in Spain is heavily affected by political questions, with the impact of tactical 
redistribution and programmatic redistribution being equally strong. More specifically, he 
ventures that the two main reasons why a region would obtain less investment than deserved are 
the fact of it: a) being a region of limited political power, and b) belonging to a group (according 
to the region’s characteristics) that also has limited political power. 
Solé-Ollé’s (2009) results show a high degree of consistency, reflecting perhaps the fact that 
single-country studies allow a much wider set of variables to be considered. Undoubtedly, his 
estimation benefits from this.  
An interesting question to emerge from these earlier studies is that of how best to approach 
the criterion of efficiency. While relating regional output to the region’s infrastructure stock 
seems a sensible way to approach the issue in an aggregated manner, the methodology would 
benefit from undertaking a more detailed and disaggregated analysis. Rich regions do not 
always have high project impact, and by the same token poor regions do not always have low 
project impact. This matter crucially depends on the previous stocks of a given type of 
infrastructure. For instance, Spain’s motorway plan (1984-1991) in stressing investment in areas 
where high capacity roads were absent was more than likely adhering to a criterion of 
efficiency. Technically, what is really important is not whether a region is rich or poor, but its 
traffic intensity (i.e.,  average daily traffic) adjusted for the existing motorway capacity (current 
level of service).  
A further distinction that might prove useful is that which exists between budget-funded 
infrastructure and user-funded infrastructure. The former is exemplified by the case of railway 
infrastructure in all countries, and by that of most of the motorways in Spain and (almost all   6
those) in Germany. However, most motorways in France and Italy are tolled, as is a non-
negligible part (roughly 25%) of the motorway network in Spain. Generally, airports and ports 
are funded by user charges (albeit that some cross subsidies are provided in some countries). It 
is quite possible that a national government will apply different criteria to the regional allocation 
of specific infrastructure investment depending on just how that investment is to be funded. In 
principle, redistribution and political objectives are more likely to form part of budget-funded 
infrastructure than infrastructure paid for by users. Thus, a disaggregated analysis according to 
infrastructure type could provide more robust results. 
As discussed above, Faguet (2004) seeks to offer explanations for centralization. In this 
paper, we attempt to verify his hypothesis for the case of Spain. It is our belief that the approach 
we adopt should facilitate an understanding of how infrastructure investment is allocated by the 
central government, supplementing analyses based on the efficiency-equity dilemma and the 
further consideration of political factors.  
Empirical analysis 
- Data and variables 
First, we describe the variables used in the empirical analysis and identify the sources drawn 
upon. The data for each of these variable were obtained at the Spanish provincial level, which 
means we have information for 51 provinces (provincias), for a period that runs from 1981 to 
2005.
1 In total, we have some 1,275 observations. The main variables were the following:  
Dependent variable 
Our main concern is to identify the determinants of central government investment efforts 
during the period studied. Therefore, our dependent variable is the ratio between gross 
investment in transportation infrastructure made by central government (I) and the gross stock of 
capital in transportation infrastructure in the previous period (kt-1). Information for these 
variables was obtained from the Fundación BBVA-Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones 
Económicas (FBBVA-IVIE) website. Data are expressed in thousands of current euros and are 
available for each transportation mode: roads, railways, airports and ports.  
Regressors and instruments 
1. Distance between the centre of each region’s capital and Madrid’s city centre 
(Distance_capital). The data for this variable were computed using the algorithm of Google 
                                                 
1 The only province not considered in our sample is Ceuta (the autonomous city on the North African 
side of the Strait of Gibraltar), owing to a problem of missing data for several variables.   7
Maps in which we calculate the shortest route in kilometres by road. This variable measures the 
central government’s centralization objective. 
2. Gross domestic product per capita (GDP_per_capita). Information for this variable was 
obtained from the Spanish Statistics Institute (INE). Data are expressed in thousands of current 
euros. This variable captures economic wealth and, as such, it measures the central 
government’s redistributional objective through its infrastructure investment effort. In an effort 
to overcome problems of endogeneity, we also used the mean number of schooling years of the 
active population (edu) as an instrument for predicting current GDP. Information for this 
variable was also obtained from the FBBA-IVIE website.   
3. Percentage number of votes obtained by the incumbent party in central government at the 
elections to the central parliament across regions (Votes). Information for this variable was 
obtained from the Ministry of Domestic Affairs’ website. This variable captures the 
opportunistic political behaviour of the incumbent party in central government. 
4. Population (Pop). Information for this variable was obtained from the INE. Data are 
expressed in terms of the total number of inhabitants and are a measure of mobility needs.  
5. Land area of the province (Land). Information for this variable was obtained from the 
INE.  Data are expressed in terms of square kilometres and provide a further measure of 
mobility needs. 
 
- Estimation strategy 
In line with the cross-section time series nature of the data, we performed several estimations 
to test our main hypotheses. First, we regressed total investments on several groups of 
determinants (Model 1) so as to analyse the political objectives of redistribution, centralization 
and electoral opportunism (i.e., our policy regressors), as well as a number of other control 
variables. The centralization objective was determined using the distance from the capital to the 
province receiving investments as our covariate. Thus, we expected a negative relationship 
between this variable and the total investment effort so as to confirm our hypothesis. Likewise, a 
negative correlation between GDP_per_capita and total investment effort would mean that 
redistribution had been considered when designing these investment programs. Since the 
literature also points to the fact that the government (or incumbent party) tends to favour those 
political communities from which it receives most electoral support, we introduced this 
opportunistic behaviour by including the Votes  variable in the model. Here, we expected a   8
positive relationship between the percentage of votes polled by the incumbent party of central 
government and the amount of investment in the corresponding province.  
Among the control variables, three groups of regressor can be distinguished. The first group is 
formed by covariates that capture mobility needs, namely population (Pop) and land area 
(Land). The second group controls for investment inertia and previous capital stock as 
determinants of current investments. Here, the variables introduced are the first lag of total 
investment efforts (iit-1
total) and the first lag of capital stock per capita (kit-1
total). The third and 
final group of regressors contain a dummy variable (D
foral) denoting with a value of 1 the 
provinces that have jurisdiction - due to political decentralization – over the network modes of 
road and rail transport and 0 otherwise. In addition, we included the time trend to take into 
account the time dimension of our data. 
We expected investment efforts to be positively associated with mobility needs but to present 
mixed – or at least unclear - effects with the second group of regressors. In fact, government 
investment programs tend to extend over more than one year, which implies an inertia that 
should positively correlate with current total investments. However, there will tend to be fewer 
investment needs in regions where the investment effort has been high in recent years thereby 
satisfying the needs for better or new infrastructure. A similar uncertainty can be attributed to 
past capital stock. Indeed, regions with more capital stock present lower public investment needs 
but it not unreasonable to consider that once a region has certain infrastructure it will have to 
maintain and renew this stock. If this is the case then we would expect a positive relationship 
between the lag of capital stock and current investments. Yet, recent studies support a negative 
correlation between investment efforts and previous capital stock in Spain (Sole-Ollé, 2009) 
Finally, the remaining control regressor, the binary variable (D
foral) should have a negative 
impact on central government investments in those transport modes under the jurisdiction of 
regional governments. Given that these modes are surface network modes, accounting for most 
of central government investments, this negative relationship is clearly expected.  
Below we present the specification of Model 1: 
 
Model 1: iit




foral + β9Time_trend + ε  
   9
Although we tested our hypothesis on the political objectives set by successive Spanish central 
governments in their investment program design, recall that we are also interested in 
distinguishing the statistical impacts of the transportation modes so as to show that considering 
total investments alone can lead to a misinterpretation of results. For this reason, in Model 2 and 
Model 3 we replicated the estimation strategy differentiating between network (roads and rail) 
and non-network modes (airports and ports), respectively. This should account for the different 
characteristics of network and non-network infrastructure. Indeed, network infrastructure limits 
the ability to extend the transportation stock, a limitation that is not suffered by non-network 
infrastructure. Thus, the regional investment distribution should only be restricted by the 
existing network in the case of surface network modes. This means that we should expect a 
stronger relationship between investment efforts and existing capital stock in the case of 
network infrastructure. The two models aggregated by mode are presented below: 
 
Model 2: iit




foral + β9Time_trend + ε  
 
Model 3: i it




island + β9Time_trend + ε  
 
As is evident, Model 3 (non-network investment) includes a variable not found in Model 2 
(network investment). This covariate is a dummy variable that identifies with a value of 1 those 
provinces that are an island (D
island) and 0 otherwise. This binary variable is considered 
necessary to account for investment in point-to-point transportation infrastructure, such as ports 
and airports, given that these provinces (islands) are not linked to the rest of the network 
infrastructure for obvious reasons. Here, the estimation that uses aggregate investment and 
investment in network modes as dependent variables excludes from its sample the island 
provinces. After all, our main goal is to distinguish between the different policy objectives 
pursued by central government and including islands in the estimations that consider surface 
network modes could distort the results of the Distance variable.   
If the differences between network and non-network infrastructure can lead to information loss 
or misinterpretation when combined in this way, it is useful to replicate the empirical strategy 
for each transportation mode separately to further investigate investment policy heterogeneity.   10
Models 4-7 therefore consider the investment effort for road, rail, airports and ports, 
respectively and are presented in the appendix together with their main results. 
Note that the only difference between Model 4 and the basic Model 2 for network investments 
is the introduction of private investments in the road mode equation. These investments are 
made by private toll motorway companies and, as such, we expect lower investment efforts 
when private investment serves to substitute public stocks. 
 
- Estimation and results 
Below we present the results of the estimation of the total investment effort equation (Model 
1).  Tables 1 and 2 show the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the main 
variables used in the empirical analysis, respectively. From these tables, we can see that all the 
variables present sufficient variability, while the multicollinearity between regressors did not 
seem to pose a problem.
2  
Insert table 1 about here 
Insert table 2 about here 
We estimated the investment equations using the Two-Stage Least Squares estimator (2SLS-
IV) because the GDP per capita variable may be endogenous. Indeed, we suspect that the level 
of investment and income in a province are determined simultaneously. Greater investment in 
transport infrastructure should have a substantial economic impact on the province benefiting 
from those investments. As instruments of GDP per capita, we used the first lag of this variable 
and the mean number of schooling years in each province as a proxy of the level of education. 
Note that neither the Hansen test nor the test of significance of the instruments rejected the null 
hypotheses that the instruments are exogenous and strongly correlated with the instrumented 
variables (See table 3). As such, these tests provide evidence of the validity of the instruments.  
Note also that we computed standard errors that were robust to any bias from 
heteroscedasticity. Additionally, we adjusted our estimates by clustering observations from the 
same region to account for the possible correlation between observations (provinces) in the same 
region (Comunidad Autónoma). 
Our estimation procedure does not take into account the panel data nature of the sample. The 
use of a fixed-effects model is not appropriate in our context since this technique excludes 
anything that is time-invariant from the model, such as the distance from Madrid or the fact of 
                                                 
2 The only exception was the high correlation between GDP per capita and the stock of capital. As we will see 
below, this high correlation did not distort the individual interpretation of results for these variables.    11
being an island. A random-effects model is also not appropriate because the individual effects 
related to provinces are likely to be correlated with the error term, as indicated by the Hausman 
test. Finally, the Hausman-Taylor estimator is inappropriate as it assumes all explanatory 
variables to be exogenous. 
Table 3 displays the results of the estimates of the investment effort equations. We first 
estimated the total investment equation considering all transportation modes and then we 
differentiated between network modes and non-network modes, as described in the previous 
section. The results of the estimates of these specifications are indicated in table 3. In table A1, 
in the appendix, we also show the results of the estimates of the investment effort equations for 
each transportation mode. Recall that a key point in our analysis was to identify differences 
between investment patterns in network and non-network modes.  
Insert table 3 about here 
Results for total investments (Model 1) presented the expected relationships – with the sole 
exception of GDP per capita, which was positively related to total investments per capita – and 
showed a good model fit (R
2 = 0.56; F-test = 772.51***). Our results confirm the centralization 
hypothesis by finding a negative and highly statistically significant impact of the variable 
capturing the distance from the political capital. Thus, regions close to Madrid seem to receive 
more investment efforts than is the case of the more distant regions. By contrast, the 
redistribution objective, captured by the GDP per capita variable, does not seem to have played 
a significant role in central government investment programs. Indeed, we found a statistically 
significant relationship for this coefficient that implies more investment efforts were made in 
rich provinces than in poor regions. Finally, as the first two policy variables were statistically 
significant, the number of electoral votes received in a given province by the incumbent party in 
central government did not seem to drive total investment plans, at least when we considered all 
modes from an aggregate perspective.  
As for mobility needs as a determinant of investment, our results were disappointing with 
neither of the variables used (i.e., population and land area) being statistically significant at the 
10% level, although they presented a positive impact on the dependent variable, with the land 
area coefficient being significant at the 15% level. More significant were the variables 
accounting for investment inertia and existing capital stock. On the one hand, the lag of total 
investments (iit-1) positively correlated with total investments and was highly significant, clearly 
indicative of the fact that investment programs usually extend over several years. On the other 
hand, the impact produced by the lag of capital stock (kit-1) on current investment efforts was   12
negative, in line with the recent literature. This implies that total investment efforts tended to 
promote new infrastructure in provinces with lower stock endowment.  
Finally, note the importance of using a variable denoting those regional governments with 
jurisdiction over their network modes. The highly significant coefficient recorded confirms that 
central government reduces its investment efforts when such powers have been transferred. 
Model 2 (network modes) and Model 3 (non-network modes) show that most of Model 1’s 
(aggregate investment) results are driven by network modes. Indeed, the model fit is not as good 
and several coefficient signs and statistical significances change in Model 3. For instance, 
network mode investment programs are influenced by the centralization strategy of investing 
near the political capital, while non-network mode investment appears to be positively related to 
distance. This means, as expected, that large ports and large airports are found only at some 
distance from the political capital. Given that Madrid is situated in the geographic centre of 
Spain (unlike most political capitals in Europe, which enjoy close access to water transportation 
modes) is an obvious explanation for the result for the ports, but in the case of airports too the 
transportation policy has avoided regional investments close to Madrid. This is equivalent to 
saying that no airports of any size have been built to compete with the capital’s airport. This is 
confirmed by Model 6 (airports) and Model 7 (ports) for each of the non-network modes. 
The rest of the policy variables also provided mixed results. First, the GDP per capita variable 
would seem to be relevant in non-network modes, although it was positively correlated with 
network investments. Second, the Votes variable was one of the only statistically significant 
coefficients in Model 3 (non-network modes) although it was not significant in the previous 
models. 
Significant differences were also to be found for the variables measuring mobility needs. Land 
area was associated with greater network investments, while in the case of non-network 
investments the population variable was significant at the 10% level. As for the other variables, 
the investment inertia coefficient was the only variable to share the same sign and statistical 
significance in both network and non-network models, although its coefficient fell appreciably 
when non-network modes were considered on their own. Previous stock was not a driving 
determinant of investment in non-network modes and the fact of being an island was only 
significant at the 15% level. 
Insert table 4 about here 
Finally, the results by transportation mode for network and non-network investments are 
presented in the Appendix (Table A1). The results show that the road and port investment   13
equations provided a better fit than the rail and airport models. In fact, the lack of data to 
describe specific traffic by mode could be a reason for their weakness. Overall, we found that 
the distance to the political capital was still statistically significant in all cases except for 
airports, albeit that the sign was positive for ports and negative for network modes in line with 
results presented before. Here again, the redistribution objective did not play any obvious role in 
determining specific mode investment efforts. However, the electoral opportunistic strategy 
presented itself as an important determinant of investment efforts in the case of roads, airports 
and ports. Interestingly, private investment in road transportation, led by toll motorway 
companies, reduced public investment efforts in regions with such private concessions. And, as 
expected, island provinces also seemed to obtain greater investment efforts for non-network – 
airports and ports - infrastructure than was the case with the mainland provinces. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The literature examining the determinants of the regional allocation of infrastructure 
investment shows that efficiency and redistribution are important drivers behind the decisions 
taken by central governments. Additionally, political factors such as electoral strength and party 
alignment have been shown to play a role. However, it is our claim that greater attention needs 
to be paid to factors associated with the broader meta-political objectives that the central 
government sets itself and seeks to implement through specific policies such as infrastructure 
investment.  
Our results for those variables traditionally dealt with in the literature (both economic and 
political) are generally consistent with previous empirical evidence. Yet, regarding our main 
empirical contribution, we have found that investment in surface network modes is influenced 
by the centralization strategy of investing near to the political capital. By contrast, the 
investment effort in non-network modes appears to be positively related to distance to the 
capital. Since investment in surface network transportation infrastructure is much higher than 
that in airports and ports, and taking into account that the regions surrounding the political 
capital are poorer than average, we suggest that centralization rather than redistribution has been 
the driver behind the concentration of public investment in these regions. 
The Spanish case would seem to illustrate the fact that centralization can be a major driver 
of the allocation of surface transportation infrastructure. Moreover, it could well be the case that 
what has traditionally been classed as redistribution is in fact a policy that seeks to connect the 
capital (the geographical centre) with the peripheral regions by means of the transport   14
infrastructure that happens to cross through less developed regions. This raises the question: Is 
the main driver redistribution or centralization? 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis (N = 1275) 
Variable Mean  Value  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum value  Maximum 
value 
i
total  0.041 0.03  0.00007  0.32 
i
network  0.041 0.052  0  1.10 
i
no-network  0.09 0.34  0  9.82 
kt-1
total  3.14 2.46  0.24  16.22 
kt-1
network  2.90 2.45  0.01  16.22 
kt-1
no-network  0.24 0.38  0  2.88 
Distance_capital  426.53 320.81  0  1770 
GDP_per_capita  9,702.98 5,566.76 825.71 28,971.92 
Land  10,162.75 4,847.82  12.3  21,766 
Population  779,964.1 938,331.4  52,388  5,964,143 
Votes_Incumbent_Party 41.89 9.87  15  66 
 







no-net Dist.  GDPc  Land  Pop. Vot. 
i
total  1                
i
network  0.98  1             
i
no-network  0.01  -0.009  1             
kt-1
total  -0.07  -0.06  0.012  1            
kt-1
network  -0.07  -0.06  0.008  0.99  1           
kt-1
no-network  -0.04  -0.06 0.04 0.17 0.05  1           
Dist.  -0.12  -0.14  0.07  -0.15  -0.21  0.47  1       
GDPc  -0.06  -0.07 0.08 0.81 0.78 0.37  -0.003  1       
Land  0.19  0.22  -0.06 -0.04 0.007 -0.42  0.32  -0.19  1     
Pop.  0.11 0.06 0.06 -0.20  -0.24 0.24 0.10 0.11  -0.14  1   
Votes  0.17  0.18  0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 -0.16  0.40  -0.03 1 
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Table 3. Investment equation estimates (2SLS) 
  Model 1: All modes  Model 2: Network 
modes 
Model 3: Non-network 
modes 


















































island  - -  0.07 
(0.04)
+ 
















F (joint sig.) 
Hansen Test 

















Note 1: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by region) 
Note 2: Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*),  and 15% (
+) levels. 
Note 3: Instruments for GDP per capita are the following: mean number of schooling years and first lag of 
GDP per capita.   
Note 4: Hansen Test: Ho is no over-identification of all instruments. Excluded instruments test: Ho is 
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Appendix 
Here we present the models used to estimate investment efforts by each transportation mode 
separately. Their results are also presented below. 
Model 4: iit




foral + β9Time_trend + β10D
toll_roads + β11Time_trend + ε  
Model 5: iit




foral + β9Time_trend + ε  
Model 6: iit




island + β9Time_trend + ε  
Model 7: iit





island + β9Time_trend + ε    18
Table A1. Investment equation estimates (2SLS) 
  Model 4: Roads  Model 5: Rail  Model 3: Airports  Model 4: Ports 







































































private  -0.0009*** 
(0.001) 
- - - 



















F (joint sig.) 
Sargan Test 






















Note 1: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by region) 
Note 2: Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) and 15% (
+) levels. 
Note 3: Instruments for GDP per capita are the following: mean number of schooling years and first lag of 
GDP per capita.   
Note 4: Sargan Test: Ho is no over-identification of all instruments. Excluded instruments test: Ho is 
weak identification of all instruments. 
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